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Abstract
In this paper, I explore how property crime can affect static and dynamic general equi-
librium behavior of households and firms. I calibrate a model with a representative
firm and heterogeneous households where households have the choice to commit prop-
erty crime. In contrast to previous literature, I treat crime as a transfer rather than
home production. This creates a feedback loop wherein negative productivity shocks
increase property crime which further depresses legitimate work and capital accumula-
tion. These responses by households are particularly important when thinking about
the effect of property crime on the economy. Household and firm losses account for
24% of compensating variation (CV) and 37% of lost production. This suggests that
behavioral responses are quite important when calculating the cost of property crime.
Finally, on the margin, decreasing property crime by 1% increases social welfare by
0.19%, but the effect is diminishing suggesting that reducing crime entirely may not
be optimal from a policymakers perspective.
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1 Introduction
In 2009, the Global Retail Theft Barometer estimates U.S. firms lost $42.2 billion to retail
theft while the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports put losses to property crime at $13.6 billion.1
With non-trivial losses to property crime and significant resources devoted to the criminal
justice system,2 we would expect large changes in economic behavior as a result. The dead
weight loss from these changes in behavior has the potential to be large with respect to the
size of direct losses to property crime.
In this paper, I examine how the presence of property crime changes worker and firm
behavior in a static and dynamic general equilibrium environment. The model consists of
two heterogeneous workers who choose labor, crime, and capital, and a representative firm
that chooses inputs to maximize profit. Unlike the previous literature where stolen goods
come from nowhere, property crime results in income being transferred from the victim
households to the perpetrator households. This is an important property of the model;
without the market for stolen goods clearing, the only changes in behavior would come
strictly from the changes in expected benefit of property crime, not from expected losses.
In my model, there are additional changes in labor supply, capital accumulation, and theft
induced by households losses to property crime.
My model suggests there are large societal losses to property crime that result from a
negative feedback loop. Because productivity shocks are transitory,3 the substitution effect
towards leisure and spending time committing property crime dominates the income effect
which result in higher property crime. As property crime increases, household income and
firm productivity decrease. This starts the initial cycle over again which results in a larger
dead weight loss.
1These numbers do not account for under-reporting of property crimes or the small sample of firms reporting,
so they are likely underestimates of the actual losses. In addition, these numbers include retail theft, so the
difference between the GRTB estimate and the UCR are quite stark.
2See Anderson (1999) where the estimated costs of all crime and prevention total $1 trillion.
3The shock hits, but dissipates over time until a new shock hits, so the substitution effect dominates the
income effect.
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I calibrate the the model to U.S. city data from a variety of sources including, but
not limited to, the American Community Survey (ACS), FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports
(UCR), National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), and several data sets and reports
from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) on the incarcerated population.4 Examining
both static and cyclical responses to productivity shocks, the model predicts that the losses
from property crime are up to 11 times as large as the monetary value of the property
reported stolen. Welfare losses from property crime range from 1.1 - 3.3% of GDP while
output lost is about 2.8% of GDP. These values are in line with accounting studies that
estimate the cost of crime. In addition, property crime accounts for 2% of cyclical volatility
in output suggesting that the feedback loop that results from property crime exists. The
inclusion of households losses to property crime accounts for 24% of the welfare cost and
37% of lost real output which suggests that policy experiments that ignore expected losses
to property crime may result in incorrect conclusions. Back of the envelope estimates put
the welfare loss at $187 - $568 billion for property crime alone. These losses are the result of
firms and workers changing the labor, capital accumulation, and crime behavior in response
to the opportunity to commit crime as well as being stolen from.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the relevant literature and
how this paper contributes to the literature. Section 3 lays out the environment, dynamic
model, and dynamic equilibrium. Section 4 discusses the data and calibration strategy for
the model and presents the calibration results. Section 5 presents the primary results and
some robustness checks. Section 6 discusses the main results and shows the results of two
counter-factual experiments. Finally, section 7 contains concluding remarks.
4Additional data sources include the BJS’s National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP), BJS’s Sur-
vey of Inmates in State Correctional Facilities (SISCF), BJS’s Survey of Inmates in Federal Correctional
Facilities (SIFCF), BJS’s “Prisoners in (YEAR)” Report , Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data on
personal income, Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS), BLS’
Occupational Employment Statistics (OES), U.S. Census Bureau’s State and Local Government Finances
(SLGF), and the Center for Retail Research’s Global Retail Theft Barometer (GRTB). For a full list of
sources, see Data Sources
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2 Literature
The most relevant strand of the literature explores the causal effect of crime on economic
outcomes and welfare. Usher (1987) provided an early model of theft that could be general-
ized to other forms of inefficiency including rent-seeking, tax evasion, etc. The author shows
that the welfare losses from theft come from the loss of output from the thief, the alterna-
tive cost of defensive labor, and destruction of property, however, the author does not say
much about the relative importance of each. Grossman & Kim (1995) suggest that poorer
individuals are better off in an equilibrium where theft exists as opposed to one without
theft.
Looking at some accounting studies and some empirical studies, Anderson (1999)
estimates the total annual cost of all forms of crime in the U.S. is about $1 trillion dollars.
The author includes the costs associated with the legal system, victim losses both monetary
and emotional, deterrence, and the opportunity cost of a criminals time. Prior to Anderson,
Zedlewski (1985), Cohen (1990), Cohen, Miller, and Rossman (1994), Colin (1994), Klaus
(1994), and Cohen, Miller, and Wiersama (1996) each considered a subset of the costs and
found estimates ranging from $19 - $728 billion dollars. Because these works are largely
accounting for the direct costs of crime, they must simplify the behavioral costs of crime by
assuming that non-criminals will behave the same without crime, and criminals will behave
like non-criminals. By modeling behavior explicitly, I estimate how much this change in
behavior matters with respect to property crime.
A number of authors have used Autoregressive Distributed Lag models (ARDL) to
estimate the effect of crime on economic outcomes. Narayan & Smyth (2004) find support
for fraud and motor vehicle theft granger causing male youth unemployment and male wages
in Australia. Habibullah & Baharom (2008) conclude that armed robbery, daytime burglary,
and motorcycle theft have a granger causal effect on economic conditions in Europe, but not
vice versa. Detotto & Pulina (2009) conclude that all crime types except murder and fraud
granger cause unemployment in Italy. Chen (2009) finds no support for any relationship
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between crime, unemployment, and income in Taiwan. Hazra & Cui also find no support
in India. Unfortunately, these authors cannot establish causality, only granger causality, so
their results could be biased. Finally, diverging from ARDL, Carboni $ Detotto (2016) use
a spatial model to estimate the effect of crime on gross domestic product. They only find
support for robbery having a negative effect on the economy.
Another strand of the literature explores the causal effect of economic outcomes on
the choice to commit crime. Becker (1968) proposes that crime be thought of as a rational
choice on the part of individuals. Chiricos (1987) reviews 68 studies on the relationship be-
tween unemployment and crime and reports that fewer than half find a positive relationship;
however, the author suggests that there is support for a strong positive relationship between
property crime and unemployment. Further, the author suggests that aggregation can lead
to mixed results. Following the drop in crime in the 1990s, there was renewed interest in
the question. Instrumenting for the unemployment rate, Raphael & Winter-Ebmer (2001)
suggest that there is a positive relationship between property crime and unemployment. Ex-
ploring both the effect of wages and unemployment, Gould, Weinberg, & Mustard (2002)
suggest that there is a strong negative relationship between wages and property crime as
well as a strong positive relationship between unemployment and property crime. The effect
of wages appears to be stronger than the effect of unemployment. Exploring the effects of
economic incentives and deterrence, Corman & Mocan (2005) support the hypotheses that
property crime is negatively related to wages and positively related to unemployment. Fo-
cusing on low wage workers, Machin & Meghir (2004) suggest that decreases in low wage
worker’s wages leads to increased crime. More recently, Yang (2017) finds that increasing
low-skilled wages reduces recidivism. Freedman & Owens (2016) find that property crime
increases in neighborhoods where some residents receive income transfers. Finally, Dix-
Carneiro, Soares, & Ulyssea (2018) show that decreasing tariffs causes an increase in crime
through its effect on labor market conditions, public goods provision, and inequality. Given
the well documented issues related to unemployment volatility in macro models a la Shimer
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(2005), these empirical results suggest that wages and hours may prove more fruitful in a
macroeconomic context.
There has been some exploration of the relationship between unemployment and crime
in the labor search literature. Burdett, Lagos, & Wright (2003) explore the relationship
between job search and crime. The authors find multiple equilibria and suggest that this
implies that two otherwise identical locations can have very different crime rates and that
good labor market conditions are relatively easier to maintain when crime is low. Extending
the model to on-the-job search, Burdett, Lagos, & Wright (2004) suggest that increasing
the unemployment insurance replacement rate can increase both crime and unemployment.
Contradicting this claim, Engelhardt, Rocheteau, & Rupert (2008) suggest that the effect
depends on job duration and deterrence such that crime decreases when UI benefits increase.
In line with the empirical literature, they suggest that wage subsidies can reduce crime.
Finally, Engelhardt (2010) suggests that decreasing unemployment duration by half would
reduce crime and recidivism by 5%.
In contrast to the search literature where crime has no victim, I include victimization
and show that it could have a large effect on counter-factual policy analysis. Without
victimization, the only reason other households respond to crime is because their wage
changes. This puts a damper on the negative feedback loop that results from crime. In
this paper, there exists both a criminal and a victim with any income gains to the criminal
coming directly from the victim whether they are a household or a firm. Because households
are directly exposed to theft, they change their behavior as a result. This creates additional
inefficiency on top of the effect that property crime has on the wage.
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3 Model
Household’s Problem
There is a unit measure of heterogeneous households consisting of some fraction φh that
are high-skilled households and some fraction φl = 1 − φh that are low skilled. Skill refers
to each household types labor income share. All households of type i ∈ {h, l} are seeking
to maximize their infinitely-lived net present value of utility (1). Each period, households
choose their labor supply N st,i, time for committing theft st,i, next periods capital stock Kt+1,i
and next periods non-incarcerated population Pt+1,i. Theft time can be allocated to theft
from firms syt,i or theft from households s
h
t,i. Households also choose market consumption C
m
t,i,
theft consumption Cst,i, and investment It,i, but these are determined by the prior choices.
max
Pt+1,i, Kt+1,i, It,i
Nt,i, C
m
t,i, C
s
t,i
sht,i, s
y
t,i
E0
∞∑
t=1
βt
{
Pt,i
(
log(σi + C
m
t,i + b2C
s
t,i) + χi log(1−Nt,i − b(s
h
t,i + s
y
t,i))
)
+ (1− Pt,i)log(σiσ +Gt)
}
(1)
King-Plosser-Rebelo preferences are used for their balanced growth property. Utility
from consumption and labor are separable with χ > 0. The baseline level of subsistence
is represented by σi. While incarcerated, individuals receive utility log(σiσ) where σ is a
multiplier for how much value the prison provides to the individual. Since incarcerated
individuals receive no consumption, they must receive some baseline value or else we have
log(0) which is undefined. Each household seeks to maximize their utility subject to 4
constraints.
The law of motion for capital evolves according to (2).
Et{Pt+1,iKt+1,i} = Pt,i[(1− d)Kt,i + It,i] (2)
Each period, households capital stock depends on last periods capital stock less depreciation
d plus what was invested in the previous period. Each household is subject to the market
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budget constraint (3) where market consumption equals labor income and capital income
minus the fraction Tt which is stolen and the fraction τ
g + τ p which is used to fund policing
and public goods provision Gt,i.
Cmt,i + It,i = (wt,iNt,i +RtKt,i)(1− ft,p)(1− Tt)(1− τ
g − τ p) +Gt,i(1− Tt) (3)
The budget constraint does not include any goods that are stolen by the household as theft
is its own form of consumption. In addition, labor and capital used for policing ft,p are paid
the same wage and rental rate as resources used for production of real goods, but since they
do not produce real goods, I either need to introduce a price or treat their income as not real.
Either case results in the same outcome. The value of consumption from theft is determined
by (4).
Cst,i = (1− ρ
y
t )
[
ayt,i(s
y
t,i)
ηYt
]
+ (1− ρht )
[
aht,i(s
h
t,i)
ηVt
]
(4)
Each worker has theft technology ayt,i which determines productivity when engaging in theft
from a firm and aht,i which determines productivity when engaging in theft from other house-
holds. A worker who engages in theft devotes time syt,i which allows them to steal some
fraction of aggregate output Yt. They also devote time s
h
t,i to stealing from other households
which allows them to steal some fraction of aggregate household income Vt. Finally, the
non-incarcerated population evolves according to equation 5
Et{Pt+1,i} = Pt,i + ζ(1− Pt,i)− (ρ
y
t + ρ
h
t )θt(
∑
i∈{h,l}
φiC
s
t,i)(s
y
t,i + s
h
t,i)
δPt,i (5)
Households committing theft face some probability of getting caught ρht for household theft
and ρyt for firm theft. If they are caught, they receive no consumption from theft. They also
face some probability θt that they are sent to jail which is itself a function of theft which can
be seen in (5). Households in jail are released with probability ζt. This means that some
fraction of each household type is incarcerated 1−Pt,i and some fraction is non-incarcerated
Pt,i. If an individual is incarcerated, their capital is distributed to the non-incarcerated
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population of their same type. Likewise, upon release, capital is distributed evenly among
the non-incarcerated population.5
Households do not internalize how their own choice of theft impacts their outcomes.
Consequently, Tt and Vt are determined outside the households problem.
Vt = φhPt,h[(wt,hNt,h +RtKt,h)(1− ft,p)(1− τ
g − τ p) +Gt,h]
+ φlPt,l[(wt,lNt,l +RtKt,l)(1− ft,p)(1− τ
g − τ p) +Gt,h] (6)
Tt = (1− ρ
h
t )
∑
i∈{h,l}
φiPt,ia
h
t,i(s
h
t,i)
η (7)
Vt is the value of aggregate income and Tt is fraction of total income that each households
tries to steal. Each households shares a proportional burden of theft such that households
with higher labor income lose the same fraction to theft as a household with lower labor
income. While there is evidence to suggest that lower income households are 1.2 times more
likely to be a property crime victim, there is no indication of how much is stolen during each
incident.6 I relax this assumption in Appendix C by increasing the burden of property crime
on lower income individuals. The results from this exercise suggest that assuming an equal
burden is a lower bound on the welfare cost of property crime as well as the output cost of
property crime.
The utilitarian government is benign, so it spends today’s revenue Revenuet on polic-
ing and transfers to maximize household utility as in (9). It has no way of smoothing revenue
over time by borrowing or lending.7
Revenuet = [φhPt,h(wt,hNt,h +RtKt,h) + φlPt,l(wt,lNt,l +RtKt,l)](τ
g + τ p)(1− ft,p) (8)
5This transfer is negligible and simplifies the process of keeping track of capital. I considered an alternative
version of the model with capital being held by inmates, but the issue of redistribution upon re-entering
the non-incarcerated population is still present.
6The Bureau of Justice Statistics publishes “Criminal Victimization” annually. Using the National Crime
Victimization Survey, they provide estimates of how often individuals of a certain income group are victims
of a property crime; however, they do not do the same for education and they do not say how much individual
groups lose on average. In the public use files for the NCVS, much of this information is top-coded.
7I relax this assumption in Appendix D by allowing the government to borrow. This reduces government
spending to an AR(1) process where log(Gt) = (1− ρg)log(ωY ) + ρglog(Gt−1) + εg,t. Overall, the effect on
the primary results are negligible and the effect on the counterfactual policy analysis is similar to the case
of unequal transfers and the case of an unequal burden of crime.
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Revenuept = ft,p
∑
i
φiPt,i(Nt,iwt,i +Kt,iRt) (9)
=
τp
τp + τg
Revenuet (10)
Revenuept is utilized for policing while Revenuet minus Revenue
p
t is used for public goods
provision in the form of household transfers.8 Some fraction ft,p of labor supply and capital
is used to prevent theft. These resources are not used for firm production. Finally, police
revenue transforms the probabilities of getting caught (11).
ρit = zpρ
i(
∑
i∈{h,l}
∑
j∈{h,y}
sjt,i)
−1(Revenuept )
ηp (11)
Law enforcement total factor productivity zp ensures that the average probability over all
time periods is the same as the underlying probability of getting caught suggested by the
data and ηp determines the curvature of policing in response to revenue.
Firm’s Problem
Firms are identical and maximize their profit every period by choosing total capital input
Kt,
9 total high-skilled labor input Ht, and total low-skilled labor input Lt. Firms are static
optimizers who solve (12).
max
Ht,Lt,Kt
Qt(zt)K
α
t H
γ
t L
1−α−γ
t −RtKt − wt,HHt − wt,LLt (12)
Since the market is perfectly competitive, firms have zero profit in equilibrium such that
wage wi,t equals the marginal product of labor and Rt equals the marginal product of capital.
Firms have a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function with high skilled
labor share parameter γ and capital share parameter α. Losses to theft depend on the
population of households committing theft, their time input, and the probability that they
8Counterfactual experiments are performed on police expenditure wherein revenue intended for policing or
public goods provision can be shifted around to the other.
9Neither household’s capital is assumed to be more productive than the other households.
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are not caught. Qt captures these factors as well as total factor productivity.
Qt = zt − (1− ρ
y
t )
∑
i∈{H,L}
φiPt,ia
y
t,i(s
y
t,i)
η
Total factor productivity zt follows an AR(1) process. This introduces short term fluctuations
which generate business cycles.
log(zt) = ρz log(zt−1) + εz,t
General Equilibrium
Equilibrium allocations are solved for by maximizing each household’s utility (1) subject
to constraints (5), (3), (4), and (2) such that Pt+1,i Nt,i, C
m
t,i, C
s
t,i, s
y
t,i, s
h
t,i, Kt,i, and It,i
≥ 0. The firm’s problem (12) is solved for Kt, Ht, and Lt subject to (3). Finally, markets
must clear in equilibrium, so the resource constraints for each household type must hold, the
government budget constraint must hold, and firm inputs must equal household labor and
capital supplies.
Kt = (1− ft,p)φhPt,hKt,h + (1− ft,p)φlPt,lKt,l (13)
Ht = (1− ft,p)φhPt,hNt,h (14)
Lt = (1− ft,p)φlPt,lNt,l (15)
Labor demand for each skill type is equal to the weighted sum of each non-incarcerated house-
hold’s labor supply. Similarly, capital demand equals the weighted sum of non-incarcerated
households’s capital stock. In both cases, some fraction of labor and capital supplied is
utilized for policing rather than production.
Solving the household’s problem gives eight equilibrium conditions for each household
type. First, households face a trade-off between leisure and consumption each period (16).
∂Ut,i(·)
∂Nt,i
= wt,i(1− ft,p)(1− Tt)(1− τ
g − τ p)
∂Ut,i(·)
∂Cmt,i
(16)
Any increase in labor supply decreases utility from leisure while increasing utility from
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consumption of market goods. Increased consumption of stolen goods can decrease the
marginal utility from market consumption, and the amount of time invested in crime can
increase the marginal disutility from labor supply.
Households face a similar trade-off between leisure and theft consumption, but this
relationship depends on the probability that a household will have to forego next period
consumption if they are caught committing a crime.
(1− ρyt )a
y
t,i(s
y
t,i)
η−1Yt = (1− ρ
h
t )a
h
t,i(s
h
t,i)
η−1Vt (17)
Households must be indifferent between a little more time devoted to household theft and a
little more time devoted to theft from firms in (17), since both choices have the same effect
on the marginal utility of leisure. Second, households face a trade-off between consumption
today and consumption tomorrow when choosing how much crime to commit in (25) in
Appendix A. If a household increases theft today, they get direct utility from increased
consumption of stolen goods, but they increase the probability of going to jail if they get
caught. This increases the disutility of committing theft since they would have to forego
consumption tomorrow.
The Euler equation for each household is fairly standard with households facing a
trade-off between consumption today and consumption tomorrow. Importantly, theft acts
as a tax on the return to capital which induces households to hold less capital and invest
less.
∂Ut,i
∂Cmt,i
= βEt
{∂Ut+1,i
∂Cmt+1,i
(
Rt+1(1− ft+1,p)(1− Tt+1)(1− τ
g − τ p) + (1− d)
)}
(18)
In the steady-state, who holds what amount of capital becomes indeterminate, so some
fraction of capital is held by each household type in the steady state. Out of steady-state,
households will choose next period’s capital according to their individual euler equations
until converging back to the steady-state and abiding by the splitting rule. Households
are constrained by their aggregate resource constraints (3) and (4). Next period’s non-
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incarcerated population is defined by flow equation (5) and the law of motion for capital (2)
determines how the capital stock evolves.
Finally, solving for the firm’s problem (12) yields three equations that pin down wages
and the return on capital.
wt,H = γQtK
α
t H
γ−1
t L
1−α−γ
t (19)
wt,L = (1− α− γ)QtK
α
t H
γ−1
t L
−α−γ
t (20)
Rt = αQtK
α−1
t H
γ
tL
1−α−γ
t (21)
Each wage (19) and (20) is determined by the marginal product of labor for each worker
type. This depends on their marginal product of labor as well as how much theft occurs.
In this case, more theft always lowers the total factor productivity for each worker type.
Likewise, the rate of return for capital (21) is determined by the marginal product of capital.
4 Calibration
I start by collecting data from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports which provides crime rates
for 181 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) as well as the U.S. This data set is merged with
Figure 1: Map of MSAs Used
13
Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Description Value Target
β discount factor 0.97 3% return on 10-year T-bills
α capital output share 0.33 capital expenditure share
ρh probability of being caught stealing from HH 0.044 clearance data
ρy probability of being caught stealing from firm 0.064 clearance data
ζ probability of release from prison 0.8 average prison sentence
z TFP 1 numeraire
d capital depreciation rate 0.1 average depreciation rate for all capital
φh percent of population that is high-skilled 0.387 ACS
φl percent of population that is low-skilled 0.613 ACS
τp tax for policing 0.006 SLGF
τg tax for policing 0.12 SLGF
ηp curvature of policing to revenue 0.5 decreasing returns to revenue
per capita personal income data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and the Local
Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) data set from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
The unbalanced panel consists of 181 MSAs over 14 years. MSA-year pairs are dropped due
to overlap with other MSAs or missing observations. MSAs provide a reasonable connection
between the markets for labor and crime.
Adding in household losses from crime, I end up with data over an 11 year period.
Table 1 shows the fixed calibrated parameters. The discount factor β = 0.97, capital output
share α = 0.33, and capital depreciation rate d = 0.1 are calibrated in a standard manner.
The percent of the population that is high\low-skilled φi is set to match the percent of the
population with and without some secondary education in the American Community Survey
(ACS).
The tax rates τi are set to match data from State and Local Government Finances
(SLGF). The curvature of the policing ηp is set to ensure that their are decreasing returns
to police revenue. Total factor productivity z is chosen as the numeraire. Additionally,
I calibrate the baseline probability of getting caught committing a crime and the baseline
probability of release from prison. The baseline probability of getting caught committing a
crime is determined based on data from the UCR. The probability of release from prison ζ
is set as 1 divided by the average sentence length of prisoners observed in the BJS’ annual
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Table 2: Jointly Calibrated Parameters
Description Value Target
χh elasticity of labor supply for H 0.698 } hoursχl elasticity of labor supply for L 0.735
σh baseline utility for H 0.303 } hours IRFσl baseline utility for L 0.166
σ incarcerated baseline utility 0.902
}
ayh TFP for theft from firms for H 0.045
ayl TFP for theft from firms for L 0.028
ahh TFP for theft from HH for H 0.032 PCR IRF, value of theft,
ahl TFP for theft from HH for L 0.030 and skill prison population ratio
b theft time discount 0.014
b2 theft consumption discount 0.484
δ curvature of jail probability function 2.590
η curvature of crime value function 0.929
ρz AR(1) process 0.608 } output IRFεz shock to TFP 0.020
θ scaling factor: probability of prison 1839 prison population
γ high-skill labor output share 0.372 wage ratio
zp TFP for law enforcement 3.771 transform on ρ
h and ρy equals 1
“Prisoners in (YEAR)” report which lists the average sentence length for prisoners convicted
of a property crime.
I use the simulated method of moments to jointly calibrate the remaining 18 param-
eters of the baseline model. Three of these parameters are calibrated to specific moments.
The scaling factor for the probability of going to jail θ = 1839 is calibrated so that the frac-
tion of the population in prison is the same as observed in data from the Bureau of Justice
Statistics’ National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP). The high-skill labor output
share γ = 0.372 is calibrated to match the wage ratio of high-skilled workers to low-skilled
workers observed in the ACS. Finally, the total factor productivity for the law enforcement
function zp = 3.771 is set to ensure that ρ
i ∗ lawenf = ρ
i.
Panel VAR10 is used to generate impulse response functions which can be used to
match the model IRFs to what agents are doing in the data. Total hours worked is aggregated
over all individuals since the results are sensitive to whether low-skilled or high-skilled hours
respond first. I use the remaining uncalibrated parameters to minimize the sum of squared
10Results of the panel VAR are available in Appendix A
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Table 3: Moments and Errors
Moment Value % Error
High-skill hours 0.336 0.326 2.99
Low-skill hours 0.3 0.301 0.39
Property Crime Rate 0.096 0.217 126
Value of HH theft 0.0025 0.0025 1.35
Value of Firm theft 0.0025 0.0026 4.05
Prison population 0.0017 0.0018 4.51
Prison skill ratio 0.14 0.14 2.36
Skill premium 2.13 1.84 13.4
errors of the difference between the model generated impulse response functions (IRFs) and
the IRFs from panel VAR. Table 2 shows the results from matching 15 parameters to 18
moments. I calibrate ρz and εz to match the level initial peak of the income IRF and
the subsequent path of the income IRF. The elasticity of labor supply χi and the baseline
utility σi are calibrated to match the level of hours and the IRF. Finally, the total factor
productivities for theft aji , the theft time discount b, the theft consumption discount b2, the
curvature of jail probability δ, and the curvature of crime value η are calibrated to match
the property crime rate IRF, the value of firm and household theft, and the high\low-skill
prison population ratio.
Looking at Figure 2a and Table 3, The model matches the theoretical moments match
the data well. Given that there is no wage rigidity in the model, it is not surprising that
total hours worked is more responsive in the model IRF than in the data IRF. One potential
concern is the large difference between the theoretical moment for the property crime rate.
My assumption in the model is that effort and crime rates are correlated, so being off on
the level is not as much of a problem as being off on the IRF. Since the IRFs are not that
different, the results should be largely unaffected.
I use compensating variation (CV) as my measure of welfare cost. Welfare is measured
as the infinitely discounted future utility of households summed up over all time periods and
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(a) IRFs
Real Personal Income PCR Total Hours Worked
Aggregate Output
∑
i
∑
j φ
iPis
j
i
∑
i φ
iPiNi
Step 1 5 10 1 5 10 1 5 10
Moment 0.034 0.008 0.002 -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 0.007 0.003 0.001
Model IRF 0.031 0.009 0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.002 0.020 0.003 0.000
% Error 8.3 9.9 52.1 8.3 20.7 15.3 200 13.8 38.8
(b) % Error for IRFs
Figure 2: Orthogonalized Shock to Real Personal Income per Capita
Figure 2a compares the IRFs from VAR (solid line) to the IRFs from the model (dashed line). Real
personal income per capita from the data is compared to the model generated aggregate output.
Second, the property crime rate from the data is compared to the aggregate effort put into crime
by households. Finally, total hours worked in the data is compared to total hours worked by
households in the model. Figure 2b shows the percent error for steps 1, 5, and 10 in Figure 2a.
household types.
Welfare =
∑
i∈{h,l}
T∑
t=1
βtφiUt,i(Pt,i, C
m
t,i, C
s
t,i, Nt,i, s
h
t,i, s
y
t,i, compi) (22)
Compensating variation is how much consumption I have to give households such that they
are indifferent between 2 different scenarios. Given different household types, the social
planner could be solving a different welfare problem depending on who they care about. In
the most general sense, the social planner is trying to solve for the level of compensation
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comp∗i needed such that both household types are indifferent between the model with crime
and one with less crime. If there is no crime, I use sji,t, but if there is 1−x% less crime, then
I calculate CV using sji,ss for both before and after since I am taking control of s
j
i,t.
T∑
t=1
βtφi
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}
= 0 ∀i ∈ {h, l} (23)
5 Results
To get an idea of how well the model performs, I compare the results to prior work. First,
what happens if more police are hired as a result of more revenue for policing? Increasing the
tax for policing, the steady-state results suggest that a 1% increase in police employment
results in a 0.33% reduction in property crime and a 0.37% reduction in the value of all
theft. Compare these numbers to Levitt (2002) where he finds that a 1% increase in police
employment reduces the property crime rate by 0.21 - 0.5%. This provides some external
validation for my model given that my non-targeted results are within the bounds found
by Levitt. Second, how does the calibrated theft consumption discount compare to the
literature. In particular, I consider the fencing value of stolen goods. This value represents
what fraction of the original value a thief can receive from resale. Roumasset & Hadreas
(1977) suggest that the fencing value may be about 50% of the original value, Stevenson,
Forsythe, & Weatherburn (2001) suggest that the rate may be in the range of 25-33%, and
Walsh (1977) and Steffensmeier (1986) both conclude that the rate is in the range of 30-50%.
The discount rate for theft consumption in my model is about 48% which is towards the
upper end of the literature, but still reasonable. This result also provides some external
validation for the model as this moment was not targeted.
The IRFs for the dynamic model can be seen in Figure 7 in Appendix F. Given a
positive shock to TFP, hours worked responds positively while overall theft and the value of
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theft decline. However, the value of theft from households increases as the value of households
increases more than the value of firms. This creates a trade-off which causes households to
switch from stealing from firms to households and since the value of households increased
more than overall output, individuals steal more from households; however, the increase in
the value household theft is negligible. This result seems strange, but it stems from how
theft from firms is structured. Theft is subtracted from TFP, so an increase in TFP results
in a small increase in labor and capital supplied which makes household theft more favorable.
Capital and market consumption respond with a lag as individuals smooth their
consumption over the course of the shock. Interestingly, the prison population increases for
high-skilled households, but declines for low-skilled households. This is because the welfare
gains of the shock for high-skilled households is lower, so there is now an incentive to commit
more household theft. This leads to an increase in high-skilled theft, but a decline in low-
skilled theft which results in the observed prison population responses. Overall, the dynamic
results are fairly robust to unforeseen shocks to every parameter as seen in Appendix F. The
only IRFs affected by shocks to the underlying parameters are ones related to crime due to
the relatively small size of crime compared to outcomes like labor and capital. The fraction
of labor and capital that goes towards policing is the most responsive outcome due to how
dependent it is on labor, capital, wages, rate of return on capital, and population.
Table 4: Compensating Variation: Crime, 1% Less Crime, and No Crime
SPP High-Skilled Low-Skilled Aggregate
type CV CV CV
∆si,ss = −1% 0.10 0.09 0.19
∆si,ss = −100% 1.04 0.57 1.61
∆si,t = −100% 1.06 0.75 1.81
CV is measured as the percentage of the net present value of output. The first row shows CV in
the case of a 1% decline in crime where CV compares two models with sji,ss and 0.99s
j
i,ss. The
second row does the same for a 100% decline in crime with CV comparing two models with sji,ss
and sji,ss = 0. The third row shows a comparison between two models with s
j
i,t and s
j
i,t = 0. For
robustness checks and additional CV measures, see Appendices E and F
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5.1 Welfare Analysis
Looking at Table 4, a 1% decrease in crime in row 1 results in a welfare gain of 0.19%, so
the elasticity is -0.19. On the other hand, a 100% decrease in crime in row 2 results in an
elasticity of -0.016. This suggests that there are large welfare gains at the margin, but the
effect diminishes before becoming larger close to zero as seen in Figure 3. The non-monotonic
shape results from policing being less effective when there is less crime. As crime approaches
zero, the effectiveness of policing goes to infinity at an exponential rate. Intuitively, if only
one person is committing crime, then all police resources can be devoted to catching that
individual. Getting rid of that last bit of crime frees up resources being devoted to policing.
From the perspective of policymakers, there are diminishing returns to decreasing crime,
so as more resources are spent on preventing crime, the marginal benefit in terms of social
welfare is declining, so there may be a point at which it is no longer optimal to prevent
crime. While there is a large potential benefit when property crime is near zero, getting rid
of property crime entirely is unlikely and policing resources are likely going to be spent on
violent crime anyways, so the last gain is probably never going to be realized even if property
crime was wiped out.
Figure 3: Effect of Crime on Social Welfare
In the third row, households must be compensated with 1.81% of baseline output if
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the social planner cares about making both household types just as well off as they would
be if crime was zero. High-skilled households must be compensated a third more than low-
skilled households since they have higher marginal productivity by definition. The fact that
they make up a smaller proportion of the population mitigates the difference between the
two household types. Comparing CV when crime is fixed in the second row and when crime
is allowed to vary over the business cycle in the third row, CV increases when individuals
are allowed to choose how much crime to commit over the business cycle. This suggests that
crime generates a negative feedback loop.
5.2 Decomposition
Table 5: Comparison: CV and Output
Baseline Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Cs T Cs, T N P φp I
CV 1.81 2.66 1.02 1.87 1.53 2.81 2.42 2.29
% difference - 46.9 -43.6 3.31 -15.5 55.2 33.7 26.5
%∆ Output 2.79 2.25 1.77 1.24 1.70 2.27 1.80 1.70
% difference - -19.3 -36.5 -55.7 -38.9 -18.5 -35.4 -39.1
%∆ std
mean
Output -1.98 -1.80 -1.47 -1.28 -39.9 -1.89 -1.88 7.97
% difference - 9.1 25.8 35.4 -1900 4.5 5.1 -303
CV is measured as the percentage of the net present value of output. In all cases, CV assumes
that crime decreases 100% and the social planner is attempting to make both households just as
well off. To refresh everyone’s memory, Cs is crime consumption, T refers to all losses by firms and
households, N is labor supply, P is the non-incarcerated population, φp is the fraction of resources
used for policing, and I is investment. Additional Discussion in Appendix E.
To get a sense of what drives my results, I individually fix several endogenous variables
and compare the two environments as in Table 5. To calculate the relative importance of
each channel, I divide the absolute value of the change in CV for each channel by the sum
of the absolute value of the change in CV for all channels. Overall, the direct channels for
property crime account for 81% of CV with the remaining effects coming from changes to
labor supply and investment. This suggests that my estimates for the effect of property
crime on welfare are not being biased too much by the overly large response in labor supply
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shown in the IRFs.
With respect to the direct effects of property crime, the second column shows the
effect of the opportunity to steal which accounts for 26% of CV and 19% of lost real output.
Fixing theft consumption Cτ results in CV increasing by 46.9% from 1.81% of output to
2.66% of output. In the other direction, the third column shows the effect of victimization
which accounts for 24% of CV and 37% of lost real output. Fixing losses to theft T and
Q− z results in CV decreasing to 1.02 as households are not that much better off in a world
without crime. These results suggest that the effect of losses to property crime are large
enough that omitting household and firm losses from a model of property crime would bias
the results of any policy analysis. In particular, the differences in output and CV suggest that
households will be at a different point on their utility curve depending on what channels are
present. Interestingly, the size of the effects diverge when comparing the changes in CV and
lost real output. The effect of victimization on CV is smaller than the effect on output while
the opposite is true for the opportunity to steal. This is because having the opportunity
to steal functions as an insurance mechanism, so it brings positive welfare to households
while victimization is always a negative outcome. The two remaining direct channels are
incarceration and policing. Incarceration is the largest contributor to CV at 31% with the
remaining 19% due to policing. The direct effects of property crime as a whole account for
81% of CV and 58% of lost output.
One concern from the calibration was the size of the labor response and the effect it
might have on welfare. Overall, it only account for 7% of CV which is fairly large, but is
dwarfed by the other effects including the investment channel which accounts for 12% of CV.
That being said, it has an enormous effect on volatility and an average sized affect on output
relative to other channels. This suggests that my estimates of CV should not be biased by
a large amount.
Finally, I compare the dynamic panel data estimates in Appendix A to the model
results as an out of sample check. The DPD estimates suggest that a 100% reduction in
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property crime would increase per capita personal income by 3.2 - 13.3%. The model results
in Table 5 suggest that the same reduction in property crime would increase income by 2.8%.
Assuming GDP is $17 trillion, this would translate to $476 billion; however, since the ability
to commit crime offers utility to households, the social welfare cost will be lower.
5.3 Policing
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Optimal Taxation for Policing
(a) shows welfare for changes in the tax rate for policing while (b) shows welfare for changes
in the share of tax revenue that goes towards policing. The solid line corresponds to the baseline
calibration with both household types receiving the same level of government transfers. The dashed
line corresponds to an alternative calibration where the low-skilled household receives twice what
the high-skilled household receives.
Related to the fact that police do not directly contribute to output, how is policing
valued by households? Using my model, I calculate the optimal level of taxation for policing
property crime. This proves tricky as households get utility from being able to commit
property crime in addition to having it prevented, and if there are more police, then there
are fewer workers earning income. This last effect is so strong that households in the model
would prefer if there was no policing, but they like police if . Given that governments might
not care about utility from property crime, it needs to be factored out when performing the
welfare analysis. Thus, the social planner is trying to solve for the level of compensation
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comp∗i,j
T∑
t=1
βtφi
{
Ut,i(·, C¯
s
i , τ
p,j, comp∗i )− Ut,i(·, C¯
s
i , τ
p∗, 0)
}
= 0 ∀i ∈ {h, l}, j ∈ [τ p τ p] (24)
needed such that both household types i are indifferent between the current level of taxation
τ p∗ and every other level of taxation τ p,j. The level of consumption derived from theft is
kept constant so that changes in the value of theft are not factored into utility. In a similar
vein, a social planner might not want to change the tax rate for policing, but may want to
change the overall share of revenue that goes towards policing in order to maximize welfare.
This would imply that additional revenue that goes towards policing is not spent on public
goods and vice versa.
Looking at Figures 4a and 4b, households would be better off with a lower tax rate
for policing and a lower share of revenue going towards policing. In particular, households
prefer that the tax rate be 0.0045 which is 25% lower than the baseline value of 0.006. As
for the revenue share, households prefer that 0.0405 % of revenue go towards policing. This
translates to a tax rate of 0.0051 for policing and a tax rate of 0.129 for public goods. The
value for the revenue share is closer to the baseline value suggesting that households have a
distaste for additional taxation. Looking at Figures 13a and 13b in Appendix F, high-skilled
households would prefer a lower tax rate than low-skilled households, but they would prefer
a higher share of revenue go towards policing. This stems from the opportunity cost of
taxation. If they are taxed and they receive a consumption transfer as a result, they are
worse off than they would be if they could put that income towards capital accumulation
whereas the low-skilled households receive a lower marginal benefit since the marginal utility
from consumption is higher for them since they have lower consumption. It is important to
note that these numbers are assuming that all revenue goes towards policing property crime
and not towards other services like preventing and investigating violent crimes. That being
said, these results do suggest that households may prefer that fewer resources go towards
property crime prevention and investigation. This is not a far-fetched results as property
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crime has one of the lowest reporting rates and many cases are never closed due to the
difficulty of finding the perpetrator and the value of property relative to a human life.11
The dashed line is Figures 4a and 4b show the importance of how transfers are
divided between the two households. The solid line corresponds to an even split between all
households while the dashed line corresponds to a an alternative calibration where low-skilled
households receive a transfer that is twice as large as that for high-skilled households. In
the alternative calibration, households would prefer higher taxes for policing and they would
prefer that a larger share of revenue go towards policing. This result is driven by differences
in the jointly calibrated parameters which make the opportunity cost of additional taxation
lower.
5.4 Transfers
Table 6: Responses to Transfers
Elasticity of Elasticity of
Total Losses Crime Effort
Gl = Gh Gl = 2Gh Gl = Gh Gl = 2Gh
Transfers to LS Workers (Revenue Clearing) 0.003 -0.01 -0.001 -0.05
Transfers to LS Workers (Fixed HS Transfers) 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.01
Transfer Multiplier 0.08 0.09 0.009 0.05
Consumption Transfer -0.01 -0.03 0.001 -0.02
Finally, I consider the how government transfers to households affect household be-
havior. Transfers can be thought of as ‘carrots’ in the ‘sticks’ vs ‘carrots’ debate on how to
reduce crime.12 I consider four different transfer cases. First, what happens if more govern-
ment transfers go towards low-skilled households at the expense of high-skilled household
transfers? Second, what if low-skilled households receive higher transfers, but high-skilled
households receive the same share of transfers as they do in the baseline model? Third, what
11Langton et al. (2012) use the National Crime Victimization Survey to investigate why people do not report
crime. They find that property crime, especially theft, is rarely reported compared to more violent crimes.
The primary reasons given were the belief that the police did not care and the belief that the police would
not catch the perpetrator.
12Corman & Mocan (2005) is titled “Carrots, Sticks, and Broken Windows.”
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if both households receive higher transfers without raising taxes? Finally, what happens if
households receive consumption transfers as opposed to income transfers?
The first row of Table 6 and Figure 8 show the effect of increased transfers to low-
skilled households at the expense of high-skilled households. Overall, there seems to be little
to no effect on the amount of effort put into property crime while the effect on aggregate
losses to property crime as a percentage of output depends on how transfers are structured
before perturbing the model. Looking at the first plot, the solid line suggests that in the
baseline model where both households receive the same level of transfer, increasing transfers
has little to no effect since any decrease in crime by low-skilled households is countered by
an increase in crime by high-skilled households. On the other hand, if low-skilled households
receive twice the transfer that high-skilled households receive (dashed line), then aggregate
losses to property crime decline. This is because the decrease in property crime by low-
skilled households outweighs the increase in property crime by high-skilled households. This
suggests that the debate around the effect of increased transfers on property crime depends
heavily on how much value households currently receive from government transfers.
The second row as well as Figure 9 show the effect of increased transfers to low-
skilled households while high-skilled households receive the same level of transfers as they
do in the baseline model. Interestingly, aggregate losses to property crime as a percentage of
output increase as transfers increase regardless of the initial level of transfers. As transfers to
households are increased, the expected value of household theft increases driving households
to steal more from other households as a result. This increase in expected value outweighs
any decrease in property crime directly resulting from higher consumption.
The third row as well as Figure 10 show the effect of increased transfers to both types
of households. As in the previous case, aggregate losses to property crime as a percentage of
output increase as transfers increase regardless of the initial level of transfers. The increase
in expected value from household theft outweighs any decrease in property crime directly
resulting from higher consumption and lower marginal utility of consumption. As with the
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previous case, the effect of transfers depends not only on how households respond to higher
income, but also on how households respond to increased incentives to commit crime.
Finally, the fourth row and Figure 11 show the effect of increased consumption trans-
fers. These transfers show up in utility, not the budget constraint as in the three prior
cases. As with the first case, the effect of these transfers depends on the initial distribu-
tion of transfers to households. In the baseline case represented by a solid line, aggregate
losses to property crime as a percentage of output increases slightly, but mostly stays the
same. Neither household changes their behavior very much. On the other hand, if low-skilled
households receive twice the transfer that high-skilled households receive, aggregate losses
to property crime as a percentage of output clearly declines as both households put in less
effort and commit less property crime.
Going back to the question of whether ‘sticks’ or ‘carrots’ are more effective at pre-
venting property crime, the results are ambiguous. Transfers to households can be effective
as in Figures 8 and 11, but the effect depends heavily on how transfers are currently struc-
tured. Overall, there appears to be little effect of transfers on property crime which is in
line with some recent working papers from Marie & van de Werve (2018) and Posso (2018).
Importantly, this is only true for cash transfers without additional requirements such as
work requirements. Increased transfers to households without requiring the government
budget constraint to clear as in Figures 9 and 10 have the opposite effect on property crime
with effort and losses increasing as a result. The effect of increased punishment is more
clearly defined with losses and effort declining unambiguously regardless of which parameter
is changed.13
6 Conclusion
Estimates of the cost of property crime hinge on who the social planner cares about, how
behavior is allowed to change in response to property crime, and how welfare is defined.
13Figures 5 and 6 both show that property crime declines with increasing punishment.
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Comparing a world with and without property crime, the model suggests that property
crime decreases welfare by 1.1-3.3% and decreases output by 2.8%. To put these numbers
in perspective, with GDP at around $17 trillion, the cost ranges from $187 - $568 billion.
These estimates are within the range of prior work. In addition, the marginal welfare benefit
of decreasing crime is diminishing suggesting that while crime has a high cost, there may be
a point at which the marginal benefit of decreasing crime does not outweigh the marginal
cost.
Diverging from previous work, any value generated from property crime is at the
expense of other agents whether they be households or other agents. The effect of losses to
property crime is comparable to the effect of being able to commit theft, accounting for 24%
of the welfare cost and 37% of the output loss. Omitting this channel has the potential to
bias any welfare and policy analysis which assumes that households and firms do not face
any direct cost.
Finally, the results for policing and transfers depend on the initial structure of trans-
fers as well as whether or not the government budget constraint clears. In the baseline
case where every household receives the same transfer, households would prefer less revenue
go towards policing. In addition, increased transfers have no effect on property crime. If
anything, losses and effort may increase with increasing transfers. On the other hand, if
low-skilled households start out with higher transfers than high-skilled households, house-
holds would prefer more revenue go towards policing. Transfers would also be more likely to
decrease losses and effort associated with property crime.
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Appendices
A Additional Equations
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B Summary Statistics and Regressions
Table 7: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs MSAs Years Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Personal Income per capita 2180 181 14 36457.6 9276.3 15499 118695
Property Crime Rate 2133 181 14 3429.8 1091.2 1108 8694.9
Larceny/Theft Rate 2156 181 14 2378.3 723.8 854.7 5459.2
Robbery 2180 181 14 105.0 61.5 3.6 458.5
Burglary 2163 181 14 789.2 337.0 158.7 2859.2
Labor Force (100,000s) 2180 181 14 6.0 7.6 0.5 45.3
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Table 8: Panel VAR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES RPINCt Hourst PCRt
RPINCt−1 0.688*** 0.051*** -0.099
(0.031) (0.019) (0.070)
Hourst−1 -0.020 0.587*** 0.298***
(0.049) (0.031) (0.111)
PCRt−1 -0.057*** 0.006 0.836***
(0.012) (0.008) (0.028)
Observations 670 670 670 670
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure 5: Effect of Policing on Property
Crime
Figure 6: Effect of Release Probability on
Property Crime
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Table 9: Baseline Blundell-Bond Estimation Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES baseline baseline diff lag(2 2) collapse
log(RPINCt−1) 1.046*** 1.028*** 1.033*** 1.070*** 0.867***
(0.0192) (0.0177) (0.0174) (0.0264) (0.259)
log(PCRt) -0.0318 -0.0593*** -0.0582*** -0.0681*** -0.133**
(0.0225) (0.0152) (0.0135) (0.0104) (0.0567)
pct child 0.143*** 0.111 0.170*** -0.0311
(0.0426) (0.0830) (0.0571) (0.277)
Constant -0.199 0.147 0.0908 -0.238 2.492
(0.262) (0.186) (0.195) (0.306) (3.214)
Observations 1,864 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224
Number of geoFIPS 180 141 141 141 141
Instruments 166 162 162 52 26
AB test for AR(2) 0.0825 0.118 0.119 0.121 0.161
AB test for AR(3) 0.800 0.557 0.555 0.562 0.534
Hansen test 0.273 0.897 0.887 0.166 0.199
∆RPINC wrt 1 std ∆PCR -0.468 -0.862 -0.845 -0.989 -1.935
se pval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 7: Orthogonalized shock to TFP
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C Unequal Burden of Crime
One of the stronger assumptions in the baseline model assumes that both households types
bear the same burden of crime. This means that both have the same fraction of their income
stolen. I relax this assumption based on data from the BJS which suggests that those in the
lowest 60% of income are 1 - 1.2 times more likely to be a victim of a crime. Extrapolating
a little, I assume that the percentage stolen from low-skilled households is 1.2 times the
percentage stolen from high-skilled households.
Tt,l = 1.2Tt,h (26)
This introduces a few differences with the baseline model. Given that Tt,i factors into the
households euler equation, having different values for each households implies that the steady-
state value of R is unique to each household.
∂Ut,i
∂Cmt,i
= βEt
{∂Ut+1,i
∂Cmt+1,i
(
Rt+1,i(1− ft+1,p)(1− Tt+1,i)(1− τ
g − τ p) + (1− d)
)}
(27)
This means that the capital income share for each household type must be different. Thus,
capitals share of income is defined by α as in the baseline model, but the high-skilled house-
hold’s capital share is κα while the low-skilled household’s capital share is (1− κ)α
max
Ht,Lt,Kt,h,Kt,l
Qt(zt)K
κα
t,h K
(1−κ)α
t,l H
γ
t L
1−α−γ
t −Rt,hKt,h −Rt,lKt,l − wt,HHt − wt,LLt (28)
Calibration for the model with unequal burden mirrors that of the baseline with the
addition of κ as seen in Table 10. I choose κ = 0.75 so that the ratio of high-skilled aggregate
household capital to low-skilled aggregate household capital is equal to 3.
As seen in Table 11, CV for the unequal burden model is about 10% larger than for
the equal burden model. CV increases from 1.77 percent of NPV of output to 1.96 percent.
In addition, Lost output increases from 3.04 percent of NPV of output to 3.12 percent. This
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Table 10: Jointly Calibrated Parameters
Description Value Target
χh elasticity of labor supply for H 0.537 } hoursχl elasticity of labor supply for L 0.765
σh baseline utility for H 0.348 } hours IRFσl baseline utility for L 0.112
σ incarcerated baseline utility 0.841
}
ayh TFP for theft from firms for H 0.061
ayl TFP for theft from firms for L 0.036
ahh TFP for theft from HH for H 0.046 PCR IRF, value of theft,
ahl TFP for theft from HH for L 0.039 and skill prison population ratio
b theft time discount 0.021
b2 theft consumption discount 0.491
δ curvature of jail probability function 2.054
η curvature of crime value function 0.882
ρz AR(1) process 0.583 } output IRFεz shock to TFP 0.022
θ probability of going to jail 2.078x103 prison population
γ high-skill labor output share 0.381 wage ratio
zp TFP for law enforcement 0.278 transform on ρ
h and ρy equals 1
κ high-skill share of capital output share 0.750 Kt,h/Kt,l = 3
is only a 2.6% difference in output. The differences are smaller for the baseline model where
the capital ratio is 4. The model fit for the unequal burden model was poor when the capital
ratio was calibrated to be 4. This is likely because the value for κ was approaching 1.
Table 11: CV Comparison
High-Skilled Low-Skilled Aggregate
CV CV CV
Equal burden (Kt,h/Kt,l = 4) 1.06 0.75 1.81
Equal burden (Kt,h/Kt,l = 3) 1.02 0.75 1.77
Unequal burden (Kt,h/Kt,l = 3) 1.09 0.87 1.96
CV measured as percentage of the net present value of
output. Equal burden refers to the baseline model.
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D Government Borrowing
With government borrowing and no lump sum taxes, the model becomes more complicated
since debt will not drop out of the consumer’s budget constraint even if the aggregate resource
constraint holds. On the other hand, because state and local government’s must balance
their budgets in the long run, debt to GDP Dss/Yss should be zero. Beginning with the
government’s budget constraint,
Gt = τ
g
∑
i
φiPt,i
[
(wt,iNt,i +RtKt,i)
]
(1− ft,p)(1− Tt)− (1 + rt−1)Dt + Dt+1 (29)
we can divide both sides by GDP Yt and look at the steady state.
G
Y
= τ g
∑
i φiPi
[
(wiNi +RKi)
]
(1− fp)(1− T )
Y
− r
D
Y
(30)
Since steady state debt to GDP is zero, either G or τ g will fluctuate to maintain the long-run
equilibrium. A similar process plays out for fp and tau
p for policing. In this case, I assume
that Gt and ft,p follow an AR(1) process.
log(Gt) = (1− ρg) log(τ
gQssYss) + ρg log(Gt−1)
log(ft,p) = (1− ρp) log(τ
pQssYss) + ρp log(ft−1,p)
E Social Planner
If the social planner only cares about one household type, they will solve the above problem
for just one household type, but give both types the same level of compensation. Finally, if
they cannot distinguish between household types or are prevented from doing so, they will
solve for the minimum level of compensation needed such that households are indifferent on
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Table 12: Compensating Variation: Crime, 1% Less Crime, and No Crime
SPP High-Skilled Low-Skilled Aggregate
type CV CV CV
∆si = −1% 0.10 0.09 0.19
∆si = −100% 1.04 0.57 1.61
Both 1.06 0.75 1.81
HS − − 3.34
LS − − 1.08
Overall − − 1.54
CV is measured as the percentage of the net present value of output. The first row shows CV in
the case of a 1% decline in crime where CV compares two models with sji,ss and 0.99s
j
i,ss. The
second row does the same for a 100% decline in crime with CV comparing two models with sji,ss
and sji,ss = 0. The third through sixth rows show a comparison between two models with s
j
i,t and
sji,t = 0. The first through third rows assume that the social planner wants both households to
be indifferent. The fourth and fifth rows assume the social planner only cares about the high and
low-skilled households respectively. Finally, the sixth row assumes that the social planner cannot
discriminate, so they only care about making households indifferent on average.
average.
∑
i∈{h,l}
T∑
t=1
βtφi
{
Ut,i(Pt,i, C
m
t,i, C
s
t,i, Nt,i, s
h
t,i, s
y
t,i, comp
∗)
− Ut,i(P
2
t,i, C
m,2
t,i , C
s,2
t,i , N
2
t,i, xs
h
t,i, xs
y
t,i)
}
= 0 (31)
This implies that some households will be over-compensated and some households under-
compensated.
If the social planner only cares about the high-skilled type, but compensates everyone
the same, they must provide 3.34% of output in compensation. Similarly, if they only care
about the low-skilled types, they must provide 1.08% of output in compensation. In both
cases, the household type that the social planner ignores is not being compensated at their
optimum. This results in behavioral changes on the part of the ignored households such
that the household type the social planner cares about ends up with a different level of
compensation than they would in the case of both types being independently compensated. If
the social planner only cares about average utility, or they are prevented from discriminating
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Table 13: Comparison: CV and Output
Baseline Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Cs T Cs, T N P φp I
CV 1.81 2.66 1.02 1.87 1.53 2.81 2.42 2.29
% difference - 46.9 -43.6 3.31 -15.5 55.2 33.7 26.5
%∆ Output 2.79 2.25 1.77 1.24 1.70 2.27 1.80 1.70
% difference - -19.3 -36.5 -55.7 -38.9 -18.5 -35.4 -39.1
%∆ std
mean
Output -1.98 -1.80 -1.47 -1.28 -39.9 -1.89 -1.88 7.97
% difference - 9.1 25.8 35.4 -1900 4.5 5.1 -303
CV is measured as the percentage of the net present value of output. In all cases, CV assumes
that crime decreases 100% and the social planner is attempting to make both households just as
well off. To refresh everyone’s memory, Cs is crime consumption, T refers to all losses by firms and
households, N is labor supply, P is the non-incarcerated population, φp is the fraction of resources
used for policing, and I is investment.
based on type, they must compensate households 1.54% of output. This is lower than the
1.81% from the case of independent compensation since the high-skilled types are now worse
off than under independent compensation while the low-skilled types are better off. In the
end, it cancels out. Ultimately, the cost of property crime depends on who one cares about
and depends on whether one cares about the value that comes from having the ability to
commit property crime. This is a big reason why the welfare cost of property crime is
significantly lower than the value of lost output that I calculated earlier (1.8% vs 3.5%).
Holding labor supply N fixed in column 5 reduces CV by 15.5% suggesting that
households are responding to the presence of theft by changing their labor supply. Taking
away the ability to change behavior is a detriment to households as a result. This is further
re-enforced by a 35.5% decline in the output response. This can be attributed to labor supply
not changing even though the marginal product of labor, the marginal utility of consumption,
and the marginal utility of labor increased. In a similar vein, holding φpolice fixed to prevent
the police from transitioning to productive labor decreases the output response by 32.2%
as these workers are not productive. Fixing investment I decreases the output response by
35.5% as investment is not at the optimum resulting in capital accumulation being lower than
desired. Finally, looking at the effect that fixing the incarcerated population has gives some
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insight into some of the more unusual outcomes in the table above. When the incarcerated
population is released, all resources are redistributed among the households which actually
reduces welfare as all resources are more spread out.
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F Robustness
Figure 8: Transfers to LS Workers (Revenue Clearing)
Figure 8 shows the impact of changes in transfers to low-skilled workers. As transfers to low-
skilled workers increase, transfers to high-skilled workers decrease. The solid line corresponds to
the baseline calibration with both household types receiving the same level of government transfers.
The dashed line corresponds to an alternative calibration where the low-skilled household receives
twice what the high-skilled household receives.
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Figure 9: Transfers to LS Workers (Fixed HS Transfers)
Figure 9 shows the impact of changes in transfers to low-skilled workers with fixed transfers to high-
skilled workers. The solid line corresponds to the baseline calibration with both household types
receiving the same level of government transfers. The dashed line corresponds to an alternative
calibration where the low-skilled household receives twice what the high-skilled household receives.
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Figure 10: Transfer Multiplier
Figure 10 shows the impact of changes in transfers holding tax revenue constant. The solid line
corresponds to the baseline calibration with both household types receiving the same level of gov-
ernment transfers. The dashed line corresponds to an alternative calibration where the low-skilled
household receives twice what the high-skilled household receives.
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Figure 11: Consumption Transfer
Figure 10 shows the impact of consumption transfers that do not show up in the budget constraint.
The solid line corresponds to the baseline calibration with both household types receiving the same
level of government transfers. The dashed line corresponds to an alternative calibration where the
low-skilled household receives twice what the high-skilled household receives.
Table 14: Calibrated Parameters
Description Baseline
Unequal Unequal Government
Transfers Burden Borrowing
χh elasticity of labor supply for H 0.698 0.719 0.537 0.699
χl elasticity of labor supply for L 0.735 0.655 0.765 0.740
σh baseline utility for H 0.303 0.300 0.348 0.303
σl baseline utility for L 0.166 0.188 0.112 0.170
σ incarcerated baseline utility 0.902 0.969 0.841 0.937
ayh TFP for theft from firms for H 0.045 0.051 0.061 0.047
ayl TFP for theft from firms for L 0.028 0.035 0.036 0.028
ahh TFP for theft from HH for H 0.032 0.060 0.046 0.033
ahl TFP for theft from HH for L 0.030 0.031 0.039 0.030
b theft time discount 0.014 0.021 0.021 0.015
b2 theft consumption discount 0.484 0.475 0.491 0.490
δ curvature of jail probability function 2.590 2.373 2.054 2.608
η curvature of crime value function 0.929 0.921 0.882 0.933
ρz AR(1) process 0.608 0.607 0.583 0.609
εz shock to TFP 0.020 0.020 0.022 0.020
θ marginal probability of going to jail 1839 2119 2078 1871
γ high-skill labor output share 0.372 0.390 0.381 0.371
zp TFP for law enforcement 3.771 2.992 2.784 3.734
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Figure 12: Robustness of CV to Changes in Baseline Parameterization
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(a) (b)
Figure 13: Optimal Taxation for Policing
(a) shows welfare for changes in the tax rate for policing while (b) shows welfare for changes
in the share of tax revenue that goes towards policing. The solid line corresponds to the baseline
calibration with both household types receiving the same level of government transfers. The dashed
line corresponds to high-skilled households while the dash-dotted line corresponds to low-skilled
households. The solid line represents overall welfare.
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